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How can Taiwan enlarge its role in the 
process of Asia-Pacific economic integration 
Da-Nien Liu, Ph.D. Director 
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Regional Development Study Center 
Abstract 
The forming of regional alliances has become a trend, and the 
number of FTAs has grown exponentially in recent years. Regionalism 
has become a trend that has not only affected functions of the WTO, but 
also severely impacted global trade, investment, and even industrial 
division of labor. 
From Taiwan's point of view, the vogue for large-scale FTAs in the 
past few years has had a major impact on Taiwan, which is heavily 
dependent on foreign trade, is closely tied up with global supply chains, 
and it has been able to sign only a handful of FTAs. 
On this basis, this paper mainly analyzes how Taiwan can assume a 
greater role and make breakthroughs in the trend of regional economic 
integration. We will first summarize global trends and latest 
developments in regional economic integration. The second part is to 
describe Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration and the 
difficulties that were encountered. The third explains how Taiwan should 
make adjustments in its industry and system to increase opportunities for 
breakthrough in regional integration, and also increase Taiwan's 
importance in the Asia-Pacific's regional economy.  
Key Words: Regional Economic Integration, Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 
JEL code : O  
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I. Introduction  
In contrast with the slow progress in multilateral trade negotiations 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the forming of regional 
alliances has become a trend, and the number of regional FTAs has grown 
exponentially in recent years. Regionalism has become a trend that has 
not only affected functions of the WTO, but also severely impacted global 
trade, investment, and even industrial division of labor. (Whalley, 2008; 
Lee & Shin, 2008; Nicolas, 2018)  
From Taiwan's point of view, countries around the world have 
accelerated the signing of FTAs to eliminate both tariff and non-tariff 
barriers over the past decade or so, and this has seriously impacted 
Taiwan's foreign trade performance. In particular, the vogue for 
large-scale FTAs in the past few years has had a major impact on Taiwan, 
which is heavily dependent on foreign trade, is closely tied up with global 
supply chains, and itself has been able to sign only a handful of FTAs. 
The U.S. announced its withdrawal from the TPP after U.S. 
President Trump assumed office, despite his emphasis on fair trade and 
bilateral measures. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) formed by the other 11 countries of 
the TPP, however, still has great influence on Taiwan's future. The 
forming of large-scale FTAs in the future will also impact Taiwan. How 
Taiwan responds to this new trend and challenges will have an important 
effect on Taiwan's future development. 
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On this basis, this paper mainly analyzes how Taiwan can assume a 
greater role and make breakthroughs in the trend of regional economic 
integration. The paper is structured as follows: The first section is an 
introduction. The second section summarizes global trends and latest 
developments in regional economic integration. The third section 
describes Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration and the 
difficulties that were encountered. The fourth section explains how 
Taiwan should make adjustments in its industry and system to increase 
opportunities for breakthrough in regional integration, and also increase 
Taiwan's importance in the Asia-Pacific's regional economy. The fifth 
section is the conclusion of this paper. 
II. Developments and trends of regional economic 
integration around the world 
A. Overview of developments in regional economic 
integration around the world 
The WTO began the Doha Round of negotiations in 2001. It was the 
most in-depth and extensive round of negotiations to ever be carried out, 
but significant progress has yet to be made in trade liberalization due to 
the higher difficulty of negotiations. The only progress made was the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA II) completed in 2013 and 2015, respectively. 
As multilateral negotiations of the WTO remained stagnant, 
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countries are turning from multilateral to bilateral. According to statistics 
of the WTO1, a total of 464 regional FTAs have taken effect between 
1950 and 2019, as shown in Table 1. Of the FTAs, 413 took effect after 
the WTO was established in 1995, accounting for nearly 90% of regional 
FTAs in effect. A total of 303 FTAs took effect after 2005, accounting for 
over 65% of all regional FTAs, showing that FTAs have become the 
emphasis of trade policies in most countries. 
Table 1  Number of regional FTAs around the world 
Year Number of regional FTAs 
1950-1959 2 
1960-1969 2 
1970-1979 11 
1980-1989 10 
1990-1994 26 
1995-1999 38 
2000-2004 72 
2005-2009 128 
2010-2014 104 
2015-2019 71 
Total 464 
Source: www.wto.org 
If we further observe the trend of regional integration around the 
world, Europe and America are two major regions of free trade that have 
formed. Even though Asia has not formed a single integrated region for 
free trade, the pace of integration is accelerating. Integration of the 
European Union, United States, and East Asia is summarized below: 
 
                                                     
1 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
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(A) EU 
The EU announced the Europe 2020 Strategy in 2010, which 
emphasizes the selection of FTA partners with market potential. The EU 
is also actively forming alliances with Asian countries under its eastbound 
policy, and it has signed FTAs with South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. 
Negotiations with Japan were completed in December 2017. The 
remaining formalities are expected to be done successfully and EU-Japan 
trade agreement is about to take effect in February 2019. Participation in 
regional economic integration has become the theme of the EU's foreign 
trade policy. 
Despite the EU expanding its external FTA network, one of its 
important members - the UK passed a referendum to exit the EU in June 
2016 due to conflicting opinions on whether or not to remain a member. 
This was a major setback to the EU's internal integration, and the parties 
are currently engaging in negotiations for exiting the EU. By schedule, 
the UK will exit the EU in March 2019. Future developments will 
continue to draw great attention. 
(B) U.S. 
The United States is the main force driving regional economic 
integration in America. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) formed on the basis of the United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement in 1988 and United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement in 
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1994 are all regional integration led by the United States. In the past, the 
U.S. mainly supported multilateralism, but also began actively 
participating in regional economic integration as multilateral trade 
negotiations of the WTO stagnated and the EU achieved further 
integration. The United States' FTA partners can be found on all 
continents, and it is clearly forming cross-region alliances; a total of 14 
FTAs are currently in effect. The U.S. is also promoting the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) with the EU. Even though the TPP was signed in 
February 2016, Donald Trump decided that the U.S. withdrew from the 
TPP in 2017. He also put the TTIP, which had been in effect since 
February 2013, on hold, making a massive change in U.S. policy for 
participating in regional integration. With the view that the U.S. will have 
better deals from bilateral agreements and old trade deals must be revised, 
the U.S. has replaced NAFTA with United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement (USMCA) and revised United States-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement (KORUS). 
(C) East Asia 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) established in 1992 is the 
longest-standing FTA in Asia, but regional integration has otherwise been 
limited. After trade liberalization by the WTO stagnated, the financial 
crisis of 1997 devastated Asia's economy, and other regions achieved 
higher level of integration, Japan, South Korea and China also began to 
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participate in regional integration and made considerable progress. 
Japan did not sign any FTAs before 2002, but has now signed 18 
FTAs since it signed the first FTA with Singapore in 2002. China and 
South Korea have a similar situation to Japan, in which China has FTA 
partners on all continents and currently has 16 FTAs in effect. South 
Korea began to exert great effort to signing FTAs with the world's largest 
economies after it signed its first FTA with Chile in 2003; currently, 16 
FTAs are in effect. South Korea has a complete FTA network as it is the 
only country to have FTAs with China, the United States, EU, and 
ASEAN. 
B. New trend of regional economic integration around 
the world 
Regional economic integration promotes trade and cooperation 
between countries, but opening the market to other countries has created a 
number of issues, such as weaker industries being impacted, more severe 
unemployment, and widening wealth gap. As a result, more and more 
people are opposing globalization, and it has led to the UK's referendum 
in June 2016 to exit the EU, the rise of political parties advocating 
populism in various countries, and Donald Trump winning the U.S. 
Presidential Election in November. These can all be viewed as important 
representatives of anti-globalization, and they have greatly impacted 
global economic and trade development. This also brought new changes 
to regional economic integration. Overall, developments can be 
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summarized into the following key points. 
(A) The United States will bilaterally promote fair 
trade 
Donald Trump's trade policy revolves around fair trade and reducing 
the trade deficit. The U.S. has evaluated the 14 FTAs that are in effect and 
begun re-negotiating the NAFTA and United States-South Korea FTA. 
The U.S. is also using a variety of trade measures to prevent unfair trade 
practices of its trade partners, and it is using tax reform and infrastructure 
expansion to ensure its interests. 
In particular, Donald Trump adopted a series of measures against 
China starting in 2018 to fulfill his commitment to reduce the massive 
trade deficit with China. He first adopted safeguard measures in January 
2018 against large washing machines and CSPV cells according to 
Section 201, Trade Act of 1974. Within the next three and four years, 
respectively, import duties on large washing machines and CSPV cells 
will be raised by 15% to 50% after exceeding the quota, and the import 
duties will be imposed on all countries that produce the goods including 
China. 
The U.S. immediately conducted an investigation into steel and 
aluminum imports according to Section 232, Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, and determined that steel and aluminum imports posed a threat to 
national security, and hindered the development of domestic industries. 
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The U.S. thus imposed import duties of 25% and 10% on steel and 
aluminum imports from around the world. Only Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil and South Korea are not covered by rising import duties. In this 
process, Donald Trump constantly criticized China's excess capacity as 
the main reason for adopting these measures. 
The subsequent investigation according to Section 301, Trade Act of 
1974 clearly targeted China, and looked into any unreasonable 
technology transfer and intellectual property rights policies that may limit 
the development of American enterprises. The U.S. announced a list of 
1,333 Chinese goods in April that it will impose an additional 25% tariff 
on. The screening principle was items benefited by Made in China 2025, 
which shows that the U.S. intends to inhibit the development of China's 
high-tech industries. China immediately announced an additional 25% 
tariff on 106 U.S. goods in retaliation. After escalating trade tensions, in 
the end of 2018, the U.S. had imposed additional tariff over 6,800 
Chinese goods which were worth about 250 billion dollars. China also 
had slapped tariff over 6,000 U.S. goods with worth 110 billion dollars. 
Based on the series of measures above, the U.S. is using its domestic 
laws and not the WTO to quickly respond to unfair trade measures of 
other countries, and is forcing countries to the negotiation table to meet 
its conditions. As Sections 201, 232 and 301 are being executed, besides 
causing a trade war between the U.S. and China that has changed the 
global economic situation, it also shows that bilateral FTAs are no longer 
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part of U.S. trade policy. 
(B) CPTPP continues to make progress led by Japan 
The outlook became uncertain for the TPP after the U.S. announced 
its withdrawal. During the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 
November 2017, Japan's active efforts led to 11 countries announcing that 
the TPP would be renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Negotiations for the 
CPTPP were completed during the meeting in Tokyo from January 22nd 
to 23rd, 2018, and the CPTPP was signed in Chile on March 8th. 
The CPTPP is the most important highlight of regional economic 
integration around the world in 2018. Even though the U.S. is no longer a 
member, the 11 countries of the CPTPP still represent 13.5% of global 
GDP and can be considered a large-scale FTA. After Japan, Mexico, 
Singapore, Canada, New Zealand and Australia ratified the deal, CPTPP 
had meet the minimum threshold to take effect on 30th December 2018. 
Quite a few countries including Taiwan have expressed their intention to 
join the CPTPP in the second round, showing that the CPTPP will 
continue to grow and its influence cannot be ignored. 
Japan is the greatest beneficiary in all of this as it not only enjoys the 
economic benefits brought by the CPTPP, but also became the backbone 
of regional economic integration by transforming the TPP, which was on 
the brink of collapsing after the U.S. withdrew, into the CPTPP. 
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Furthermore, Japan also signed an FTA with the EU in 2018 and is 
currently negotiating several bilateral FTAs, which is a change from its 
conservative position in the past. 
(C) Regional economic integration will be carried 
out through bilateral FTAs and large-scale FTAs 
Based on current development trends, regional economic integration 
has not been affected by the rise of anti-globalization, and countries other 
than the U.S. will continue to participate in integration through bilateral 
FTAs and large-scale FTAs. (Dan & Xiao & Ali, 2017; Rodrigo & 
Sebastian, 2017, Rachel, 2018) Key points are as follows: 
1. RCEP 
Members of the RCEP continued to actively engage in negotiations 
after the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the TPP. Numerous 
negotiations have been held and the 16 countries have discussed multiple 
issues, already reaching an agreement on Economic and Technical 
Cooperation, Small and Medium Enterprises, Customs Procedures and 
Trade Facilitation, Government Procurement, Institutional Provisions, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and Standards, Technical 
Regulations and Conformity Assessment Procedures. Even though the 16 
countries clearly expressed their determination to complete RCEP 
negotiations in 2018, progress has been slow due to the wide gap in the 
position of member states during negotiations. However, 16 countries 
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have noted that the task to conclude RCEP is getting urgent, RCEP 
members hope to conclude as early as in 2019.  
2. Asian countries continue to engage in FTA 
negotiations 
In addition to large-scale FTAs, such as the CPTPP and RCEP, East 
Asian countries continue to dedicate active efforts to bilateral FTAs, 
unaffected by the change in U.S. trade policy. Japan will focus on the 
CPTPP and EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, and will make 
active efforts to complete RCEP negotiations. The China-Japan-South 
Korea FTA also made progress in 2018. The latest meeting was held in 
China in December 2018. China is currently engaging in upgrade 
negotiations with its FTA partners, i.e. ASEAN, Pakistan, Singapore, 
New Zealand, and Chile, in which the upgraded FTA with ASEAN took 
effect in July 2016, the upgraded FTA with Chile and Singapore signed in 
2017 and 2018 respectively. China is also engaging in negotiations for the 
China-Japan-South Korea FTA and the RCEP, and it is actively 
negotiating FTAs with countries along the Belt and Road Initiative to 
expand its economic influence. 
South Korea aims to complete negotiations for the RCEP, South 
Korea-ASEAN FTA, and South Korea-India upgraded FTA, and will also 
begin negotiations for MERCOSUR, a revised FTA with Chile and an 
FTA with Mexico. ASEAN countries will prioritize negotiations for the 
RCEP. Among ASEAN countries, Vietnam has made the most significant 
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progress. Vietnam currently has bilateral FTAs with Japan, Chile, South 
Korea, and the EU. 
III. Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration 
In contrast with the rapid developments of other countries in signing 
FTAs, Taiwan's path has been extremely difficult. The following section 
describes Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration. 
Prior to Taiwan’s accession to the WTO in 2002, all of Taiwan’s 
efforts were focused on securing WTO membership; it was felt that 
pursuing FTAs would only result in the delaying of Taiwan’s accession to 
the WTO. After becoming a member of the WTO, Taiwan began to 
actively explore possibilities for signing FTAs with other countries; this 
became a major focus of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. Taiwan held 
preliminary talks with a large number of different countries, including 
Japan, the ASEAN member states, the U.S.A., and the small group of 
countries with which Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations. 
From Taiwan’s point of view, besides the economic benefits that 
FTAs would bring, securing the signing of FTAs would also represent a 
major diplomatic breakthrough for Taiwan, and would thus have dual 
significance. However, precisely because of the significant diplomatic 
benefits that securing FTAs would have Taiwan, Taiwan’s efforts to 
negotiate MTAs with other countries ran up against a series of major 
obstacles. Eleven years on from Taiwan’s accession to the WTO, 
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Taiwan’s concrete achievements in terms of the securing of FTAs are 
limited to the signing of FTAs with five countries in Central America 
with which Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations: Panama, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.2 
The reason why Taiwan’s progress in securing FTAs with other 
countries has been so slow is of course the China factor. As a result of 
China’s rapid economic growth, as well as China’s active efforts to secure 
participation in regional economic integration following its accession to 
the WTO in 2001, countries throughout the world have been focusing on 
developing the opportunities that have emerged as a result of the opening 
up of the China market, while also coming under pressure from China to 
reject overtures from Taiwan. When forced to choose between Taiwan 
and China, foreign countries have naturally chosen China, making the 
securing of FTAs with China their main objective. At the same time, the 
process of negotiating an FTA is inevitably related to the issue of national 
sovereignty. Wary of how China would respond, other countries have 
been reluctant to proactively seek trade negotiations with Taiwan; this has 
had a major impact on Taiwan’s efforts to negotiate FTAs. 
Given the difficulty that China’s interference caused to Taiwan’s 
efforts to negotiate FTAs, in order to achieve a breakthrough in this 
regard, Taiwan naturally reoriented the focus of its efforts towards those 
countries with which Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations, where 
                                                     
2 http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=764 
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China’s ability to interfere would, of course, be reduced. The countries 
with which Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations are mostly located in 
Central or South America, Africa, or the island countries of the Pacific 
Ocean. In terms of the size of their economies and the maturity of the 
relevant systems and structures, the countries located in Central or South 
America offered the best potential for negotiating FTAs, and it is this 
region where Taiwan has had the most success in signing FTAs. 
It was only after the thawing in “cross-strait” relations between 
Taiwan and China in 2008, and the commencement of negotiations for the 
signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 
with China in 2009, that the obstacles to Taiwan’s negotiating of FTAs 
with other countries grew less pronounced. (Cyrus C.Y., 2009 ; Chen T.J., 
2010) 
In 2013, Taiwan secured some major breakthroughs in its efforts to 
secure greater participation in regional economic integration. On July 10, 
2013, the Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic 
Cooperation (ANZTEC) was signed, followed on November 7, 2013 by 
the signing of the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic 
Partnership (ASTEP). The signing of these FTAs with New Zealand and 
Singapore represented a major step forward in terms of Taiwan’s ability 
to successfully negotiate FTAs with countries other than those with which 
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it has formal diplomatic relations. However, given the rapid pace of 
regional economic integration, Taiwan still has a long way to go to catch 
up. 
In fact proactive participation in regional economic integration has 
been a key element in the foreign trade policy of almost all countries. 
Examination of the FTAs that have been negotiated in the past few years 
shows that there has been a trend towards large-scale FTAs that are to 
some extent in competition with one another; at the same time, the range 
of issues addressed by FTAs has grown broader, and their economic 
impact has grown more pronounced. In addition, it has become more 
common for existing regional groupings to establish their own regional 
FTAs. Overall, FTAs have become an extension of countries' economic 
and diplomatic clout. From Taiwan's perspective, as a country heavily 
dependent on international markets, the negative impact of these trends 
has been enormous. 
Of course Taiwan's government is aware of this situation and has 
been actively expanding its FTA network. The Cross-Strait Service Trade 
Agreement with China in 2014, however, raised concerns about being too 
dependent on China, and led to the Sunflower Movement, which forced 
all subsequent negotiations of the ECFA to be terminated. Party 
alternation in 2016 led to tense cross-Strait relations and put Taiwan in an 
even tougher position with respect to FTAs. 
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IV. Taiwan's role and response strategy 
A. Trends of Taiwan's exports 
With regard to how Taiwan can play an important role in regional 
economic integration when facing changes in the global situation, 
changes in Taiwan's position in the Asia-Pacific will first be described. 
The manufacturing industry has always been the core of Taiwan's 
economic development due to the long-standing export-oriented trade 
policy. Facing the pressure of rising labor costs in Taiwan, labor intensive 
companies that could only compete with lower prices were forced to 
move their production bases overseas. As labor intensive industries 
moved to China and Southeast Asian countries, capital intensive 
industries continued to develop in Taiwan, and the manufacturing 
industry has remained the core of Taiwan's development. As a result of 
downstream manufacturing industries relocating overseas and the 
industry moving towards mid- and up-stream, Taiwan's external trade 
connections and supply chain in Asia has changed. (Liu & Shin, 2012) 
Table 2 shows Taiwan's exports between 1996 and 2017 have 
become more concentrated towards the intermediate and capital goods 
with a rising percentage. Nearly 80% of Taiwan's exports between 2011 
and 2017 were intermediate and capital goods. 
Table 3 shows Taiwan's exports to developed countries, such as the 
EU, United States, and Japan, is decreasing, while exports to emerging 
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countries, such as China, ASEAN, and India, is significantly increasing. 
Nearly 60% of Taiwan's exports between 2011 and 2017 were to China 
and ASEAN countries. This shows the growingly close direct trade 
relations between Taiwan and Asian countries. 
Table 2 The Change in the Structure of Taiwan’s Export Products 
 
Raw  
Materials 
Intermediates and  
Capital Goods 
Consumer  
Goods 
Average share of exports in 1996 - 2000 1.71% 74.51% 23.78% 
Average share of exports in 2001 - 2005 1.28% 78.07% 20.64% 
Average share of exports in 2006 - 2010 1.10% 78.95% 19.95% 
Average share of exports in 2011 - 2017 1.25% 79.13% 19.62% 
Source: Collated from Taiwan Customs data. 
Table 3 The Change in Taiwan’s Export Markets 
 Country 
Average share of total exports 
1996 – 2000 (%) 2001 – 2005 (%) 2006 – 2010 (%) 2011 – 2017 (%) 
1 
China 
(including 
Hong Kong) 
23.90 35.03 40.48 40.02 
2 ASEAN 12.43 12.78 14.86 18.35 
3 U.S.A. 24.51 17.64 12.47 11.43 
4 E.U. 15.31 12.94 10.69 8.64 
5 Japan 10.17 8.42 6.83 6.44 
6 S. Korea 2.10 2.97 3.46 4.24 
7 Australia 1.44 1.20 1.24 1.15 
8 India 0.46 0.60 1.08 1.13 
9 Canada 1.31 1.00 0.74 0.78 
10 Mexico 0.64 0.60 0.58 0.65 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Collated from Taiwan Customs data. 
Observing the trade between Taiwan and regions it mainly exports to, 
Figure 1 shows that increasing ratio of intermediate and capital goods 
exported by Taiwan to China and ASEAN, especially China. Meanwhile, 
exports of intermediate and capital goods to the EU, Japan, and the 
United States continued to decline. Taiwan mainly exported consumer 
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products to the United States, ASEAN, and the EU, followed by China 
and Japan. 
This shows that Taiwan has adjusted its industry structure along with 
changes in the production environment, and is now even more focused on 
the production of mid- to up-stream products. Taiwanese companies view 
Asian countries as a base for processing and exports, and their 
investments have driven trade and brought industries in Taiwan and Asian 
economies to work closer together. The division of labor between 
industries in China and ASEAN countries, in particular, has shown an 
upward trend. 
Taiwan's consumer products are still mainly exported to the United 
States and EU, but exports of intermediate goods and capital goods have 
declined and direct trade relations have weakened as well. Indirect 
exports to Europe and America have increased through processing and 
production chains in China and ASEAN countries. 
In summary, this trade pattern is directly related to Taiwan's overseas 
investments. Taiwan's overseas investments are mainly made in China 
and Southeast Asia, which Taiwan basically views as its overseas 
processing bases. Taiwan exports intermediate goods and capital goods to 
China and ASEAN for processing into consumer goods, and finally 
exports the consumer goods to countries in Europe and America, forming 
triangular trade. Even though Taiwan has worked hard to expand the 
global market for consumer goods, the triangular trade described above 
20 
remains Taiwan's main trade pattern. 
When the end consumer product market is in a slump, e.g. the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis and the European debt crisis, exports from 
processing bases in China and Southeast Asia to Europe and America will 
decline, and Taiwan's exports to China and ASEAN will also significantly 
decline due to this trade pattern. Effects of this chain reaction are grow 
stronger further upstream, and countries upstream of the production chain 
are impacted more, which is known as the bullwhip effect, causing 
Taiwan to be greatly impacted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Taiwan customs statistics 
Figure 1:  Changes in product categories exported by Taiwan 
The IT and electronics industry represent a large portion of Taiwan's 
industry structure and are more susceptible to international fluctuations. 
Table 4 shows the nominal value of Taiwan's four main industries in 
2000-2016, in which the IT and electronics industry has grown the fastest 
with a rising share reaching 31.3% in 2016. Taiwan's industry structure 
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has clearly shifted towards the IT and electronics industry under the 
guidance of Taiwan's industry policy. As a result, Taiwan's exports are too 
concentrated in IT and electronics products. Electronics and ICT products 
have always accounted for at least 30% of Taiwan's total exports. Due to 
the higher income elasticity of ICT and electronics products, consumers 
can easily defer consumption. Hence, any fluctuations in the global 
economy will considerably impact Taiwan's economy, and it also affects 
Taiwan's ability to make adjustments. 
Table 4 Changes in Nominal Industrial Production in Taiwan, 2000 - 2016 
Units: NT$ billions; % 
Industry 
Nominal 
Industrial 
Production in 
2000 
Share of 
Total (2000) 
Nominal 
Industrial 
Production 
in 2011 
Share of 
Total (2011) 
Nominal 
Industrial 
Production 
in 2016 
Share of 
Total (2016) 
Growth 
Rate (2000 – 
2016) 
Overall Industrial 
Production 
11,087.38 100.00% 18,147.08 100.00% 19,624.50 100.00% 3.63% 
B Mining and quarrying 36.65 0.33% 18,147.08 100.00% 25.61 0.13% -2.22% 
C Manufacturing 9,556.88 86.20% 146.14 0.81% 17,335.38 88.34% 3.79% 
Metallurgy and 
machinery manufacturing 
industry 
2,695.92 24.32% 17,173.15 94.63% 4,766.85 24.29% 3.63% 
IT and electronics 
industry  
2,910.29 26.25% 4,410.73 24.31% 6,143.71 31.31% 4.78% 
Chemical industry 2,267.49 20.45% 5,948.85 32.78% 4,180.48 21.30% 3.90% 
Food and textile industry  1,683.18 15.18% 4,865.41 26.81% 2,244.34 11.44% 1.81% 
D Electric power and gas 
supply 
376.26 3.39% 1,948.16 10.74% 684.69 3.49% 3.81% 
E Water supply and 
pollution prevention 
89.47 0.81% 629.80 3.47% 229.24 1.17% 6.06% 
F Construction 1,028.12 9.27%   1,349.58 6.88% 1.71% 
Source: Collated from data compiled by the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan  
B. Taiwan's Challenges 
(A) Economic aspect 
Taiwan has been impacted even more by the large-scale FTAs that 
continue to grow even larger around the world due to this trade pattern. 
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The division of labor and completeness of industrial chain in each region 
covered by FTAs will affect Taiwan's position in the industrial chain in 
Asia. The CPTPP is further described below. 
First, Table 5 shows that members of the CPTPP already have a 
complete FTA network, and the CPTPP will further integrate the 11 
countries after it becomes effective. Of the 11 countries in the CPTPP, 
Taiwan only has an FTA with New Zealand and Singapore. Besides the 
impact to tariffs, the CPTPP continues the strict country of origin 
regulations of the TPP to strengthen division of labor between industries 
and supply chain connections within the region. Since Taiwan mainly 
exports intermediate goods, this may weaken Taiwan's original role in the 
CPTPP's supply chain, or even cause the production chain to break, 
which is a challenge Taiwan must face. 
Table 5  FTAs between members of the CPTPP 
 
Japa
n 
Canad
a 
Australi
a 
Mexic
o 
Malaysi
a 
 
Singapo
re 
Vietna
m 
Chil
e 
Per
u 
New 
Zealan
d 
Brun
ei 
Japan   △ △ △ △ △ △ △  △ 
Canada    △    △ △   
Australi
a 
△    △ △ △ △ △ △ △ 
Mexico △ △      △ △   
Malaysi
a 
△  △   △ △ △  △ △ 
Singapo
re 
△  △  △  △ △ △ △ △ 
Vietnam △  △  △ △  △  △ △ 
Chile △ △ △ △ △ △ △  △ △ △ 
Peru △ △ △ △  △  △    
New 
Zealand 
  △  △ △ △ △   △ 
Brunei △  △  △ △ △ △  △  
Note: △Indicates a bilateral FTA was signed 
  Indicates new connection from joining the CPTPP 
Source: Prepared by this study 
Looking in more detail at the challenges that regional economic 
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integration can be expected to pose for Taiwan in the future, the key 
factor here is the CPTPP, which is currently the most significant regional 
trade arrangement in the Asia Pacific region. The CPTPP already has 11 
member nations, and has been advocating a strengthening of the 
intra-regional supply chain. This means that, in the future, the CPTPP will 
implement strict rules of origin (RoO) provisions, which will consolidate 
the linkage of supply chain in the region and promote the development of 
the intra-regional division of labor, but which may have a negative impact 
on Taiwan. (Michaela, 2012; Thang & Yuqing, 2017)   
Taking Taiwan’s textile industry as an example, currently Taiwan 
exports large quantities of yarn and fabric to Vietnam, where it is 
processed into garments for export to the CPTPP region. Under the 
current “yarn forward” approach adopted for the CPTPP’s rules of origin 
in relation to garment manufacturing, Vietnam will be required to use 
yarn produced in another CPTPP members in order to benefit from 
preferential tariff treatment when exporting garments to the CPTPP This 
will led to the existing Taiwan  Vietnam  CPTPP supply chain 
being disrupted, with Taiwan suffering the most serious adverse impact. 
Given the strictness of the CPTPP’s rules of origin requirements, a 
similar situation is likely to emerge in other industries. 
(B) Political aspect 
For Taiwan, securing membership of the CPTPP means not only 
complying with the requirements of the CPTPP Agreement in regard to 
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economic issues; because of Taiwan's unique diplomatic status, it will 
also require Taiwan to take the China factor into account. 
Membership of the TPP is open to all APEC member economies; 
however, in principle, the process of applying for membership of the TPP 
cannot be completed until the applicant economy has completed 
negotiations with all existing CPTPP members regarding the terms and 
conditions of accession. 
Taiwan currently does not have formal diplomatic relations with any 
of the 11 existing CPTPP member states; by contrast, not only do the 11 
CPTPP member states all have formal diplomatic relations with China, 
they also have important investment and trading links with China. If 
relations between Taiwan and China remain tense in the future, it can be 
anticipated that attempts by Taiwan to secure membership of the TPP will 
be subject to interference by China. Although China is not currently a 
member of the CPTPP itself, the dramatic growth of the Chinese 
economy means that the amount of influence China is able to exert within 
the international community is growing steadily larger, and will affect 
Taiwan's ability to secure accession to the CPTPP. It may well be that, 
while refraining from making a formal, public statement of opposition to 
Taiwan's membership of the CPTPP, China will privately ask existing 
CPTPP members to adopt a cautious attitude towards the negotiation of 
CPTPP membership for Taiwan, to drag out the process of bilateral 
negotiation as long as possible, or even to issue a direct refusal to accept 
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Taiwan's membership of the CPTPP. 
Even if Taiwan does succeed in securing participation in the second 
round of CPTPP accession talks, based on Taiwan's past experience when 
attempting to secure membership of international organizations, it can be 
anticipated that China will insist on the adoption of the same model used 
in regard to Taiwan's and China's accession to the WTO, whereby3 China 
asked that Taiwan not be allowed to join the WTO before China; similarly, 
China would ask the CPTPP to agree that Taiwan would not be given 
membership of the CPTPP before China. Although China's stance 
towards the CPTPP has become less oppositional, with China expressing 
a more positive attitude towards the CPTPP while at the same time 
promoting other FTAs (such as the RCEP) as a counterweight to the 
CPTPP. Nevertheless, China's economic and trading systems are still very 
far from being in conformity with the CPTPP's requirements. Coupled 
with the fact that China would not join the CPTPP that is tailor made for 
the United States, it is highly unlikely that China will join the CPTPP. If 
China were to adopt the WTO model, Taiwan's accession to the CPTPP 
will be delayed considerably. 
                                                     
3 GATT (document C/M/259): “Many contracting parties, therefore, had agreed with the view of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) that Chinese Taipei, as a separate customs territory, should not 
accede to the GATT before the PRC itself.” 
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C. Taiwan's Response 
(A) Industry 
1. Brand Promotion 
Taiwan will only face a growingly severe export environment as the 
CPTPP and more FTAs begin to take effect. Since Taiwan mainly exports 
intermediate goods, strict place of origin requirements in future FTAs to 
strengthen the bond between industries in the FTA region will cause 
Taiwan's exports to be further excluded. 
The added value of Taiwan's exports is not high due to Taiwan's 
focus on manufacturing. OEM products account for a significant 
percentage of exports, resulting in the high percentage of intermediate 
goods exported. Taiwan lacks global brands and has relatively weak 
ability to integrate downstream of the value chain. This has resulted in the 
relatively low percentage of end consumer products exported by Taiwan. 
This is why Taiwan is more easily directly affected by the global 
economy. In the future, Taiwan must face the issue of accelerating brand 
building through marketing. 
Branding is a difficult road. The 2016 Interbrand survey showed that 
the total value of the world's top 100 brands reached US$18 trillion. None 
of the brands were from Taiwan. Even though the majority of the top 100 
brands belong to Western countries, Japan already has 6 brands, South 
Korea has 3 brands, and China has 2 brands. The value of Taiwan's 
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largest brand is only about 40% of the value of the world's 100th brand. 
Taiwan must catch up. 
2. Industry Diversity 
Besides changing the model for connecting to the world, Taiwan 
must also expand the aspects in which it makes connections. An 
important reason why Taiwan's economy was severely impacted by the 
global financial crisis in recent years is the concentration on ICT products 
and lack of diversity. Taiwan should actively develop new products and 
new industries based on development trends of the global market. 
Therefore, Taiwan must redefine its role in global industries. Countries in 
Europe and America have been bringing back their industries and 
implementing re-industrialization and Industry 4.0 in recent years. The 
red supply chain China is actively building has created great pressure on 
Taiwan's production. The rise of a new digital economy has changed the 
structure of industries, and mobile communications has created new 
business models. Taiwan has not been able to effectively become part of 
this change and seize market opportunities of a new generation of 
products. Hence, Taiwan should actively engage in innovation to develop 
new generation industries. 
(B) System 
In addition to the effects of market opening, Taiwan must also carry 
out system reform. Taiwan will need to implement an inventory-taking of 
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domestic laws and systems and identify where they are in conflict with 
the requirements of major FTAs. It will need to formulate clear plans with 
regard to adjustment procedures and timetables, to ensure that all 
necessary revisions of relevant laws and regulations are completed. This 
will show that Taiwan is a mature economy and can meet the 
requirements of any FTA with high standards. Taiwan also needs to have 
a thorough understanding of the issues that are of concern to major 
countries. Areas on which Taiwan will need to focus include promoting 
reform of the agricultural sector and state-owned enterprises, enhancing 
the transparency of administrative procedures, and formulating relevant 
guidance measures as early as possible to as to be able to respond to the 
negative impact of market opening on Taiwan's less-competitive 
industries. This proactive approach will demonstrate Taiwan's 
commitment to securing membership and help Taiwan secure the support 
of other countries. 
In the case of the CPTPP, besides the emphasis on traditional market 
opening in the agricultural, industrial and service sectors, the CPTPP also 
stresses the need to reduce non-tariff barriers. The non-tariff barriers with 
which the CPTPP is concerned are not limited to "on the border" 
measures; they also include member states' "behind the border" systems 
and regulatory frameworks. (Rodrigo & Pierre, 2017)  Areas such as 
e-commerce, competition law, environmental protection, finance, 
telecommunications, intellectual property rights, government purchasing, 
investment, legal harmonization, transparency, natural person status, 
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labor rights, etc. all fall with the scope covered by the CPTPP. These are 
areas where Taiwan will need to make adjustments in the future. 
In the future, Taiwan can cut in through the following aspects: 
(1) Taiwan's position in the global industrial supply chain can help 
maintain the completeness of the supply chain in the Asia-Pacific. 
Taiwan is an important part of the international supply chain. 
According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 issued by the 
WEF, Taiwan's industrial suppliers ranked 9th in quality and 3rd in 
quantity among the 148 countries that were rated. Taiwan ranked 1st in 
the world in the completeness and depth of industrial cluster development. 
Taiwan's globalization experience and foundation for supply chain 
integration will help countries integrate resources, create economic and 
trade opportunities, increase the production efficiency of supply chains, 
and optimize resource allocation. This will benefit the completeness and 
stability of international supply chains, and drive economic and trade 
development in the Asia-Pacific. 
Taiwan is an important supplier of ICT products for the world, and 
plays a key role in the global supply chain for numerous products, such as: 
notebooks, tablet PCs, motherboards, CDs, DSL terminals, LCD monitors, 
foundry, and wireless network products. By participating in regional 
economic integration, Taiwan can create more cooperation and 
development opportunities for member states in the field of electronics 
and ICT. 
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(2) Taiwan's strength in investments and trade can drive industrial 
development and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. 
Taiwan has a tight network of investments in the Asia-Pacific, and 
plays a key role in industrial technology transfer within the region. On 
one hand, Taiwan is independently developing or obtaining technologies 
from advanced countries. On the other hand, Taiwan is transferring 
technologies to emerging countries through its investments. Taiwan can 
enlarge its role in providing capital and technology transfer by 
participating in regional economic integration. The partnership between 
Taiwan and member states in investment and trade can create even more 
opportunities for industrial and economic development and benefit both 
sides. 
Aside from the macro perspective described above, Taiwan can cut 
in through the following aspects for major countries in the Asia-Pacific. 
For Japan, Taiwan serves as a hub in the production network of 
developing countries in East Asia for many industries, such as steel, 
machinery, and electronics and ICT. Industries of Japan, Taiwan and 
Southeast Asian Countries are engaged in vertical division of labor and 
trade. Once Taiwan is excluded from regional economic integration, it 
will affect Japan's overall economic interests. 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Taiwan and Japan 
complement each other very well. If Taiwan is able to participate in 
regional economic integration, it will benefit investments between SMEs 
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in Taiwan and Japan. The complementary advantages both sides have in 
technology and market development abilities will give SMEs in Taiwan 
and Japan the opportunity to jointly develop markets. 
For East Asia, Taiwan plays an important role in the production 
network in Southeast Asia for steel, plastics, electronics, and electrical 
equipment. Once Taiwan is excluded from economic integration, it will 
impact the industrial development in Southeast Asian countries. 
Participating in integration will help Taiwan increases its investments in 
Southeast Asia, and will create even more technology spillovers and 
employment opportunities. 
V. Conclusion 
Taiwan has maintained high economic growth in the past, and was 
called an economic miracle for being one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world. In recent years, however, Taiwan's economic 
growth has clearly hit a bottleneck and is even starting to go downhill. In 
the eight years from 2000 to 2018, Taiwan's economic growth rate was 
lower than the global growth rate, and was even negative for the first time 
in two of the years. Stagnant economic growth also resulted in slow GDP 
per capita growth in Taiwan; Taiwan's GDP per capita almost doubled in 
the 10 years from 1990 to 2000. In the 18 years from 2000 to 2018, 
however, Taiwan's GDP per capita only grew about 60%. 
Many reasons can explain Taiwan's stagnant economy, but slow 
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progress of participating in regional economic integration is indisputably 
one of the more important reasons that has affected Taiwan's trade and 
industrial development. The significant growth in number of FTAs 
around the world in recent years has significantly affected Taiwan. The 
development of FTAs from bilateral to multilateral and covering a 
broader scope has impacted Taiwan even more. 
In the future, Taiwan must accelerate its industrial transformation, 
promote diverse industries, and build brands. Internally, Taiwan must 
strengthen communication for consensus building. Externally, Taiwan 
must utilize its economic strength to persuade others that Taiwan 
participating in regional economic integration is beneficial to the region 
and will create a win-win situation. 
Of course, Taiwan must understand that any breakthrough in FTAs 
will only be possible with stable cross-strait relations. This is the reality 
in the international society. Taiwan must face this reality even if it is not 
desirable, and cannot continue to avoid and reject the issue. If 
harmonious cross-strait relations cannot be maintained in the future, 
Taiwan's path to FTAs will only become harder. 
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